Where is the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) getting the money it is using to pay the jihadis? Why is the Nigerian military apparently more poorly equipped and trained than the jihadis? Who is funding the jihadis? We know that they get some of their money from ransoms for hostages, which is why they keep kidnapping people. But there are also moneyed interests that favor their jihad, and support it financially.
“Islamic State is incentivising ISWAP to target military stockpiles,” Institute for Security Studies, by Taiwo Adebayo, Institute for Security Studies, November 12, 2026:
Rather than launching opportunistic ambushes, the Boko Haram faction targets military bases in return for payment from Islamic State.
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) pays fighters based on the weapons and military equipment they capture during attacks on Nigerian and regional military bases. A fixed price list set by the Islamic State, which funds the payments, assigns amounts to weapons, ammunition and military vehicles, new research from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) shows.
The ISS has previously documented how ISWAP often raids military bases and loots military stockpiles – unlike rival Jama’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad (JAS), which primarily targets civilians. ISWAP was believed to be motivated by the need to gather weapons, reduce reliance on arms smugglers and consolidate territorial control across the Lake Chad Basin.
These explanations are still valid. But new information reveals a payment system that underpins and supplements the group’s ideological foundation.
Sources with direct knowledge of ISWAP’s finances and operations, including ex-fighters, revealed to ISS how the finance department accounts for spoils, called ghanimah. The group retains one-third of the total, with the rest going to those who participate in the attack.
The ghanimah pricing system helps attract and keep fighters when ideology alone is insufficient
An AK-47 for example yields US$750, and a rocket-propelled grenade US$1 000. A box of ammunition brings in between US$500 and US$1 000 depending on the calibre. A pickup fitted with a heavy weapon, the kind that features in ISWAP’s propaganda after major raids, is worth US$30 000. These sums are paid in naira to the fighters, and are not trivial amounts in the Lake Chad Basin economy.
Across the region’s four countries (Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria and Niger), national monthly minimum wages range from US$53 to US$108, and gross domestic product per capita is between US$775 and US$1 972. In the border areas where Boko Haram operates, actual incomes fall well below those sums. Years of conflict and climate stress have left communities in the area economically marginalised.
The institutionalisation of financial incentives makes ISWAP’s attack patterns distinct, and partly explains the ongoing targeting of specific military bases rather than opportunistic ambushes. JAS fighters, by contrast, earn an income primarily through direct predation and robbery of civilians. ISWAP forbids this among its own fighters.
Because ISWAP strictly regulates weapons and its members typically do not carry arms unless deployed, there is limited opportunity to rob civilians. JAS, which exercises no equivalent arms discipline, routinely does the opposite, including raiding camps for displaced people.
The income mechanism each Boko Haram faction has chosen determines how they relate to civilians in their areas of operation, and ultimately shapes which group is better able to sustain community cooperation.
Beyond targeting leaders, counter-terrorism measures should identify networks that support ISWAP’s resilience
The methods also show how the two factions have constructed income streams for their fighters, recognising the need for material incentives. In addition to ghanimah (spoils of war), ISWAP has been paying some fighters’ salaries of ₦75 000 – little more than Nigeria’s national minimum wage of ₦70 000, or US$53 – from its own internal revenues.
Ex-fighters told ISS that the ghanimah pricing system helped attract and keep members when faith and ideology alone were insufficient. Without it, they said, ISWAP would struggle to retain its newer generation of fighters, especially those recruited through coercion or economic incentives….
Taffy says
Something is horribly wrong with the Nigerian military if they cannot secure their bases from theft or looting. Another theory is that the theft is by the corrupt Nigerian military. Splitting the spoils with Boko Haram is a great way for a Nigerian soldier or officer to supplement his pay.
Sentinel says
This article does NOT specify the military bases-Are they American bases in different countries or in Nigeria. Stupid Americans travel to these shaky countries for sightseeing, religious reasons or for teaching positions. The world is now a very dangerous place to travel; so why the heck would you put yourself in that position to begin with.