Al Qaeda jihadists and their related “men of violence wearing the cloak of religion advance their aims and objectives by corrupting and misrepresenting religious texts,” claimed terrorism analyst Rohan Gunaratna in a 2002 book, just after 9/11. Yet analysis of this typo-plagued work, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, published by the prestigious Columbia University Press no less, reveals varied false reasonings and predictions, now evident 25 violence-filled years after September 11, 2001.
Gunaratna clearly claimed that jihadists such as Al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri lacked Islamic doctrinal justifications “for their political mission.” In Gunaratna’s words, “contemporary Islamists such as al-Zawahiri and Osama are engaged in an unprecedented exercise of corrupting, misinterpreting and misrepresenting the word of God.” Gunaratna concluded:
The question must be posed: is Al Qaeda Koranic or heretical? Although Al Qaeda claims that all its inspiration is from Islam, its massacring of innocent men, women and children (believers and non-believers alike) is contrary to God’s word.

Accordingly, Gunaratna called for a “powerfully articulated counter-ideology” to jihadism. Otherwise, “Al Qaeda can come to represent the truth for some Muslims and would-be mujahid. Therefore, an integral part of the strategy against Al Qaeda should include non-military measures, such as exposing its heretical nature.” Gunaratna assessed that “only by challenging the Islamists’ misinterpretation and misrepresentation of the Koran that the international community can inflict long-term strategic damage” to groups such as Al Qaeda.
Gunaratna assigned Muslims the leading role in this ideological struggle:
As Al Qaeda poses a durable long-term threat to Muslims worldwide, it is the Muslim elite who must stand up and fight the threat it represents. The West can help, but it is a battle that can best be fought and won by Muslims against Muslims.
Based on such reasoning, Gunaratna foresaw a rather brief life expectancy for jihadist groups. “Islamist groups such as Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas remain potent threats despite sustained action against them by Israel and its allies for two decades,” he noted. “Nonetheless, history shows that every terrorist group has a lifespan. Statistically, most guerrilla and terrorist campaigns last between thirteen and fourteen years.”
Al Qaeda would likewise have a short duration in Gunaratna’s estimate:
Al Qaeda is driven by a religious ideology but Osama is a secular leader with no religious authority. Just as Nazism effectively died with Hitler, Islamism of the Al Qaeda brand is likely to die with Osama. His death will break the momentum of the campaign.
Gunaratna determined that support for jihadist groups came not so much from the spiritual realm but more from the material realm of political grievances. He criticized “a skewed US foreign policy aimed at securing Middle Eastern oil for American industry as well as guaranteeing the security of Israel (a recurring electoral issue).” This “leads the US to support authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes—and Israel—without observing checks and balances.”
The West must remedy its wrongs against Muslims in order to stifle the cry of jihadist ideology, Gunaratna argued:
Like other extremist ideologies, such as Nazism and Fascism, violent Islamism will always find modest support. However, the widespread support it enjoys today is driven by the strong belief among Muslims that the West has persistently wronged them. It is international neglect of the Muslim interest in the Palestine and Kashmir conflicts, the presence of US troops on Saudi soil and the frequent double standards of the big players that have legitimized the use of violence.
Such social justice corresponded to Islam’s supposedly pacific nature in Gunaratna’s view:
The vast majority of Muslims, like people of other faiths, want to live in peace and harmony. But they will only support the global campaign against terrorism and their leaders’ participation in it if the rest of the world is seen to concentrate its attack on the whole range of relevant issues, not just the weapon of terror alone.
Yet Gunaratna’s own citations to Islamic theological sources hardly refute jihadist ideology, particularly with respect to terrorist targeting of civilians, such as the Palestinian Muslim cleric Abdullah Azzam. This “ideological father of Al Qaeda,” a “mentor of Osama bin Laden,” was “one of the leading Islamists of his generation” and supposedly opposed the killing of kufar (infidel) or mushrikeen (polytheist) civilians. In Azzam’s words, “Islam does not urge is followers to kill anyone among the kufar except the fighters and those who supply mushrikeen and other enemies of Islam with money or advice.”
Gunaratna’s acceptance of this apologetic surprises, for critical scrutiny reveals hardly any protection for noncombatants in Azzam’s statement. Supplying “enemies of Islam with money or advice” could easily define the financial Moguls who grew America’s economy from the World Trade Center on 9/11, or American Christians who evangelize apostates from Islam. Moreover, Azzam accepted collateral damage, for “Muslims do not have to stop an attack on mushrikeen [polytheists], if non-fighting women and children are present.”
Likewise, the “religious scholar most quoted by Osama,” Gunaratna noted, is namely the medieval Muslim theologian Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1312). He stated: “As for those who cannot offer resistance or cannot fight, such as women, children, monks, old people, the blind, handicapped and their like, they shall not be killed, unless they actually fight with words and acts.” Thus, such individuals are military targets even if they merely “fight with words,” a stipulation somehow overlooked by Gunaratna.
Yet more discouraging, Taymiyyah further added that a minority Muslim jurist opinion holds even that all such civilians “may be killed on the mere ground that they are unbelievers.” These minority jurists, though, “make an exception for women and children since for Muslims they constitute property.” Rather than dying, as property these non-Muslims can become chattel slaves.
Bin Laden also did not lack Muslim clerical support after he issued his February 23, 1998, pronouncement of an “International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” Subsequently, 40 Afghan clerics issued a March 12, 1998, fatwa calling for jihad against Americans and another fatwa from Pakistani-based clerics followed in late April 1998. “Critics who claimed that Osama had no legal authority to issue a fatwa were neutralized when these two bodies issued similar fatawa,” Gunaratna observed. Sheikh Ali al-Hudaif, imam of the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, Saudi Arabia, also publicly supported in June 1998 bin Laden’s call for American troops to leave Saudi Arabia.
Gunaratna’s own writing indicated that bin Laden and Al Qaeda were hardly pariahs among Muslims. “Whenever Al Qaeda interacted with a terrorist group or a government, its potent Islamist ideology and the irresistible financial rewards it offered saw them either become fully absorbed into the wider Al Qaeda network or fall within its sphere of influence,” Gunaratna observed. “It was only a matter of time therefore before the Taliban began to succumb to Al Qaeda’s broader strategic plan” after Al Qaeda shifted its base under international pressure from Sudan to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in May 1996. Within a year the Taliban “too had turned against the West and the government in Kabul was offering a safe haven for terrorists.”
Sunni Muslims such as bin Laden also found common cause in terrorism across sectarian divides with Shiite Muslims, as documented by both Gunaratna and Lawrence Wright’s Pulitzer Prize-winning 2006 book, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11. Al Qaeda had significant cooperation with the Lebanese Shiite jihadist organization Hezbollah and its state sponsor, Iran’s Shiite Islamic Republic. Bin Laden held the view, Wright explained, “that there was only one enemy now, the West, and the two main sects of Islam needed to come together to destroy it.” Thus, Al Qaeda learned suicide bombing techniques from Hezbollah.
Jihadist terrorism from groups such as Hezbollah directed against Israel has not provoked significant criticism from Muslims over the years, furthering weakening Gunaratna’s theological theories. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at its April 1-3, 2002, Malaysia summit “failed to condemn the tactic of suicide terrorism” utilized by Palestinian jihadists against Israel, he recalled. The OIC was “fearing that condemnation of Palestinian suicide bombings against Israeli civilian targets would criminalise the Palestinian struggle,” he argued.
OIC concern is thoroughly understandable, given that efforts to destroy Israel have always involved terrorism throughout history. Yet Gunaratna downplayed the “immoral response by the OIC” as a “reaction to the failure of the West adequately to condemn incursions by the Israel Defence Forces into Palestinian territory.” He did not explain whether these incursions, which the OIC in its conference documents denounced as “state terrorism,” in turn were justified responses of Israeli self-defense.
Gunaratna’s criticism of Israel only highlights how his cited Muslim grievances against the West merely reflect the demands of the “Islamism” he condemns. Jihadists, for example, have targeted Israel not because of any material harm of Zionism to the Middle East but rather because they reject a Jewish state as a supposed defilement of Muslim land. Similarly, the presence of American troops in the Arabian Peninsula aggravated bin Laden and others due to the supposed sacrilege of non-Muslims in Islam’s holy land. The Kashmir conflict also reflects the desire of jihadists to incorporate this Indian-ruled territory into a more theologically pure Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Meanwhile Gunaratna’s invocation of the once-common trope that Western support of dictators in Muslim-majority countries incites Muslim rage has become more suspect in the quarter century after 9/11. As failed democratic regime strategies in the Middle East in Iraq or during the 2011 “Arab Spring” have revealed, dictators are often the only check upon popular, yet illiberal, Islamist movements. Often dictators are the only ones willing to implement his recommendation that Muslim societies with Western help “build schools and community centres that impart a modern education and instill humane, non-sectarian values.”
Gunaratna’s recommendations for Afghanistan are clearly suspect, now that 20 years of an American-led military campaign, begun while he was writing, have ended in failure. “Clearly the US has no public support from the Muslim world either to fight terrorism or to remain in Afghanistan,” he admitted after reviewing global Muslim opinion surveys with disastrous results for America. Yet “the US, its allies and its coalition partners would be taking an incalculable risk if they withdrew from Afghanistan without creating the security socioeconomic and political conditions for a modern system of government to function.” As indicated by the surveyed regressive Muslim outlooks, such conditions never emerged in Afghanistan, no matter the Western efforts.
Gunaratna appears to believe that human conscience is the dominant factor in Muslim morality concerning matters such as terrorism, but Al Qaeda’s behavior demonstrates the overriding importance of Islam’s prophet Muhammad. His supposedly canonical biography determines the line between right and wrong for the faithful. Thus, as Wright observed, Al Qaeda cited Muhammad’s army besieging in 630 Arabia’s city of Taif with catapults, despite civilian harm, as precedent for destroying the World Trade Center with hijacked airliners.
Such indiscriminate catapults could just as well justify the use of nuclear weapons, which the Islamic Republic of Pakistan already possesses and which the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to acquire. Here bin Laden had no objection, for, as quoted by Gunaratna, defending Muslims was a “religious duty” and therefore it would be “a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims.” Similarly, three days after India’s May 11, 1998, nuclear test, bin Laden called for “the Muslim nation and Pakistan—its army in particular—to prepare for the jihad. This should include a nuclear force.”
Given such stakes, the mistakes of analysts such as Gunaratna concerning Islam should serve as a warning, as the last 25 years since 9/11 have been dangerous enough. The continuing existence of groups such as Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, and its various derivatives such as the Islamic State have demonstrated jihad’s longstanding appeal among Muslims, whether Shiite or Sunni. Meanwhile the OIC has condemned Israel, and not Palestinian jihadists, for terrorism, and attempts to humanize the Muslim world with democratic nation-building have failed. The world can ill afford such threats and mistakes in the future.
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