Arab States Wary, as in Gaza, What’s to Come Is Still Unsure

Already, after the ballyhoo both at the Knesset and at Sharm el-Sheikh, when Trump repeatedly insisted that the “war in Gaza is over,” the Arab states are now alarmed that what’s to come is still unsure. Hamas has not fulfilled its part of the hostages-for-prisoners swap, having returned only 7 of the 28 bodies it had promised to deliver. In response, Israel closed — but for only one day — the Rafah Crossing, and again, only for one day, reduced by half the number of trucks with humanitarian aid allowed to enter Gaza. But now comes the hardest part: making Hamas surrender its weapons. And the Arab states are becoming convinced that Hamas will refuse to fulfill its promise to do so. They are not about to make plans for a government of Arab technocrats to take over in Gaza as long as armed Hamas operatives continue to hold sway. More on Arab concerns about Hamas’s refusal to turn over its weapons can be found here: “Are Arab states already pessimistic about the future of the Gaza deal? – analysis,” by Seth J. Frantzman, Jerusalem Post, October 15, 2025:

A report in Arab News on October 15 noted that “Gaza ceasefire outlook darkens as Israel delays aid and Hamas tightens grip.”

This is one of a series of reports that appear to illustrate that regional countries are concerned that the developments in Gaza are not moving in the right direction. These media reports reflect the thinking in these countries.

The pessimism is understandable. The question is what these states hope to do about it. Many of these countries wanted the war to end. They also sent delegations to Egypt to work with the US toward ending the war. However, many of the countries continue to appear to be hedging on what may come next.

The Gulf states have a lot to offer in terms of potential support for Gaza. However, so long as they think that the plan to end the war doesn’t have teeth behind it, they may not move forward, besides paying lip service to the deal….

The reconstruction of Gaza will cost at least $50 billion. Such sums can come only from the rich Arab states of the Gulf — especially the UAE and Saudi Arabia — and those countries want Hamas, as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood that threatens their regimes, to be completely disarmed, replaced by a government of technocrats, and with its senior leaders sent into forced exile, most likely to Turkey. But Hamas says that it will “never” disarm, now that the IDF has pulled back from more of Gaza, giving Hamas free rein to attack its enemies in those areas from which the IDF just left. Hamas now claims to have called up 7,000 new recruits, and is locked in combat with the powerful clans in Rafah, Khan Yunis, and Gaza City. The outcome of those fights remains uncertain.

So far, Hamas has returned seven bodies of murdered Israeli hostages, out of 28 it had promised to deliver. After the first four bodies were delivered, Hamas said it needed time to find others that it claimed were under the rubble. Israel in response closed the Rafah crossing and decreased by half the amount of aid allowed into Gaza. Within a few hours of that announcement, Hamas suddenly found another four bodies that it delivered to Israel that very evening. Israeli forensic experts determined that one of the bodies was not an Israeli, but a Palestinian Arab, so as of now Hamas must deliver, or account for, 21 bodies it claims it cannot find.

Hamas has announced that it will not disarm. It is fighting the half-dozen large clans that have challenged its authority in Gaza’s cities, and if it defeats them, it will remain in power. Both Netanyahu and Trump have said that Hamas “must disarm,” and have threatened that if it won’t do so voluntarily, that disarmament will be carried out, as Trump warned, “violently.” In other words, the IDF will renew its fight against the terror group in order to finish it off, as it had been doing in Gaza City before Washington’s pressure on Netanyahu lead to the latest ceasefire.

It is likely that Turkey, Egypt, and some others are basically fine with working with Hamas. In fact, Ankara may prefer Hamas, which will make it even harder to dislodge the group or disarm it.

Erdogan may be “fine with working with Hamas,” but Egypt, which has outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood — and Hamas is the Gazan branch of the Brotherhood — would not be so sanguine. General al-Sisi would be deeply disturbed if Hamas remained in power in Gaza.

Also, as long as Israel insists that the deal be followed, it will be difficult to proceed to the subsequent stages. One incentive to move on to new stages may be the desire by Hamas and others to see the IDF withdraw more in Gaza. So far, the IDF controls what is called the Yellow Line in Gaza. This is essentially half of Gaza.

“As long as Israel insists that the deal be followed, it will be difficult to proceed to the subsequent stages.” This is a bizarre remark. Why shouldn’t Israel, that has been scrupulous in fulfilling its commitments — pulling back its troops to a perimeter much closer to the Gaza-Israel line, freeing nearly two thousand prisoners, including hundreds who were serving life sentences for mass murdering of Israelis — not insist that Hamas meet its commitments as well? Why blame Israel for insisting Hamas stick to what it agreed to, which the writer says will make it “difficult to proceed to the subsequent stages?” That’s the opposite of the truth. What makes it “difficult to proceed to the subsequent stages” is Hamas’s refusal to disarm, as it had committed to doing under the Trump deal.

Israel has scrupulously adhered to its commitments under Phase One of the deal. It is Hamas that not only refused to deliver, as promised, 28 dead hostages, but, much more important, has announced that it will not disarm, as it was required to do during Phase Two of the deal. That’s why the Arab states are wary; if Hamas cannot be forced to change its mind, the deal will blow up and the IDF will resume fighting.

The Arab states will wait on the sidelines while the situation with Hamas in Gaza becomes clearer. If the terror group is disarmed “violently,” then the plans for a technocratic government to replace it can go ahead, as can planning for the enormous effort at reconstruction that the Saudis and Emiratis will largely pay for.

For now, the Arab states are cautiously pessimistic.