Turkey, Jihad, and Counter-Terrorism

Major Jihadist Attacks and Security Operations in Turkey

Turkey endured a string of jihadist attacks from 2013 to 2017, prompting massive counter-terrorism operations nationwide. Key incidents include:

• Reyhanlı Bombings (May 2013): Two car bombs exploded in the border town of Reyhanlı (Hatay province), killing 52 people. The Turkish government blamed a network linked to Syrian intelligence, though some reports suggested jihadist involvement. Regardless of the perpetrator, Reyhanlı was a harbinger of Syria’s conflict spilling into Turkey.
• Suruç Bombing (20 July 2015): A suicide bomber hit a gathering of leftist and pro-Kurdish activists in Suruç (near the Syrian border), killing 32. Turkish officials identified the bomber as a Turkish citizen tied to ISIS’s Dokumacılar cell. This was ISIS’s first known attack on Turkish soil, shattering the notion that Turkey could avoid the group’s wrath.
• Ankara Peace Rally Bombing (10 October 2015): In the deadliest terror attack in modern Turkish history, twin ISIS suicide bombers targeted a peace rally outside Ankara’s main train station, killing 109 people (mostly Kurdish and leftist demonstrators). The attack, just weeks before a parliamentary election, stunned the nation. It exposed the reach of ISIS’s Turkish networks – one of the bombers was reportedly linked to the same Adıyaman-based group behind Suruç. The carnage intensified public pressure on Ankara to crack down on jihadist cells.
• Istanbul Tourist District Bombings (2016): ISIS struck Turkey’s tourism sector with two suicide blasts in Istanbul. In January 2016, an ISIS bomber blew himself up among German tourists in Sultanahmet Square, killing 12. In March 2016, another suicide bomber hit İstiklal Avenue (a popular pedestrian mall), killing 5. These attacks, targeting foreigners and civilians at the heart of Turkey’s largest city, underscored ISIS’s shift to indiscriminate terror as it began losing territory in Syria.
• Atatürk Airport Attack (28 June 2016): In a coordinated assault reminiscent of the 2016 Brussels airport bombing, three ISIS operatives armed with guns and suicide vests attacked Istanbul’s Atatürk International Airport. They opened fire in the terminal and then detonated their explosives, killing 45 people (Turks and foreigners) and wounding over 200. Turkish authorities said the attackers were foreign nationals (from Russia and Central Asia) linked to ISIS’s Syria units. This brazen hit on one of the world’s busiest airports demonstrated the clear and present danger ISIS posed to Turkey’s critical infrastructure.
• Gaziantep Wedding Bombing (20 August 2016): A suicide bomber (allegedly a 12-year-old boy) attacked a Kurdish wedding party in Gaziantep, near the Syrian border, killing 57 people – many of them children. ISIS was blamed for this heinous act, likely aiming to inflame ethnic tensions between Turks and Kurds.
• Istanbul Nightclub Shooting (1 January 2017): In the early hours of New Year’s Day, an ISIS militant infiltrated the upscale Reina nightclub in Istanbul and gunned down 39 people, most of them international revelers. ISIS claimed the massacre as revenge for Turkish military operations against it. The gunman (an Uzbek national) was captured after a manhunt. This attack, coming after the 2016 bloodbath, was the last major ISIS-attributed attack inside Turkey to date.

In total, ISIS-backed terrorism killed hundreds in Turkey between 2015 and 2017, traumatizing the public. Turkish cities were put on high alert as ISIS hinted at more to come. Notably, since early 2017 Turkey has prevented any large-scale jihadist attack on its soil for several years – a testament to intensified security efforts. Nevertheless, smaller plots and attempts have continued to surface, including the 2024 ISIS-K plot against a church.

In response to the ISIS wave, Turkey’s security forces launched sweeping counter-terror operations to break up jihadist networks. Domestically, police and intelligence (MIT) conducted frequent raids and mass arrests of suspected ISIS members. For instance, in late 2023 Turkey’s Interior Ministry announced the arrest of 189 ISIS suspects in 37 provinces in a single nationwide sweep (Operation “Heroes-38”). The raids, timed before New Year celebrations, reportedly foiled planned ISIS attacks on churches, synagogues, and even the Iraqi Embassy in Ankara. Only a week earlier, another 304 ISIS suspects were rounded up across Turkey. These figures highlight the scale of Turkey’s counter-ISIS dragnet. In one year alone (2017), authorities detained over 2,090 individuals for ISIS links, with more than 1,100 ISIS members prosecuted and imprisoned. Turkish courts have meted out heavy sentences to ISIS operatives; for example, in 2020 a senior Turkish ISIS member was jailed for over 12 years on terror charges.

On the military front, Turkey also took the fight to jihadists beyond its borders. In August 2016, the Turkish army launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria, deploying tanks and special forces across the border to oust ISIS from a 98-km stretch of territory. In the course of Euphrates Shield (which lasted until March 2017), Turkey-backed forces “neutralized” some 3,060 ISIS fighters and seized key towns like Jarablus and al-Bab from ISIS control. This offensive removed ISIS’s presence along Turkey’s immediate border and was hailed in Ankara as a major blow to the caliphate. Turkish intelligence (MIT) has also actively hunted ISIS leaders in Syria and Iraq. In April 2023, President Erdoğan announced that MIT agents had located and killed ISIS’s global emir, Abu al-Hussein al-Qurashi, in a raid in northwest Syria. Such high-value target operations burnish Turkey’s counter-terror credentials and eliminate the jihadist leadership that could orchestrate attacks.

Despite these successes, challenges remain. Many ISIS members went to ground instead of fighting Turkish forces head-on, and sleeper cells still exist. Turkish security forces intermittently uncover arms caches or bomb factories in its cities. Foreign ISIS members have also tried to use Turkey as an escape route; Ankara has responded by deporting thousands of suspected foreign fighters. By late 2017, Turkey had banned 53,781 individuals from 145 countries from entering (placing them on a no-entry watchlist) and deported 5,446 foreign nationals for suspected terror ties. This reflects Turkey’s role as a frontline state in managing the aftermath of ISIS’s jihadist influx.

Turkey’s Counter-Terrorism Policies: Evolution and Shifts

Turkey’s approach to jihadist terrorism has significantly evolved, shaped by internal security considerations and geopolitical pressures. Broadly, Ankara’s policy shifted from tacit tolerance in the early years of the Syrian war to active combat and prevention after 2015, once ISIS turned its guns on Turkey.

In the years before 2011, Turkey’s security establishment viewed jihadist activity as a secondary threat. The primary focus was on Kurdish separatists (the PKK) and, to a lesser extent, far-left militants. Jihadist groups like Turkish Hezbollah or local al-Qaeda cells were handled through periodic police operations but did not dominate the security agenda. Turkey’s official secular ideology also meant that overt Islamist extremism was monitored warily, yet the state sometimes underestimated groups like Turkish Hezbollah in the 1990s – a mistake that arguably allowed those groups to escalate their campaigns until confronted by force.

With the outbreak of the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War (2011), Turkey initially pursued an aggressive policy to oust Assad, which indirectly affected its stance on jihadists. From 2011 to 2014, Turkey maintained an open-border policy for Syrian refugees and rebels. During this time, jihadist volunteers and arms flowed across Turkish territory with relative ease. Turkish officials argued that distinguishing “moderate” rebels from jihadists was difficult, and indeed some ISIS-bound fighters entered with seemingly valid travel documents under humanitarian crossings. Ankara was reluctant to crack down harshly on Islamist fighters, fearing this would weaken the Syrian opposition’s war effort. Moreover, Turkey was wary of the West’s priorities: it hesitated to fully join the anti-ISIS coalition. For example, Turkey refused to allow U.S. use of its İncirlik Air Base to strike ISIS until late 2015, hoping to leverage its cooperation for a broader anti-Assad strategy.

The turning point came as ISIS’s threat to Turkey grew undeniable. By mid-2015, after the Suruç bombing and escalating ISIS attacks on border towns, Ankara shifted to an openly confrontational stance against ISIS. In July 2015, Turkey formally joined the U.S.-led coalition to defeat ISIS, finally permitting coalition aircraft to use Turkish bases and launching its own airstrikes on ISIS in Syria. Simultaneously, Turkey initiated domestic crackdowns: on July 24–25, 2015 (immediately after ISIS killed a Turkish border guard), security forces launched dawn raids arresting hundreds of suspected ISIS operatives across Turkey. This marked the beginning of Turkey’s “hard” counter-terrorism push against jihadists.

Turkey’s counter-terror policy has since become increasingly institutionalized and robust. Key pillars include:

• Enhanced Border Security: Turkey erected an 830-km wall along its border with Syria (completed by 2018), equipped with surveillance gear to prevent militant infiltrations.
• Intelligence-Led Policing: Proactive intelligence operations to detect and preempt plots before they materialize.
• Broad Legal Measures: Turkey’s terrorism laws are very expansive, defining terrorism to include not just violent acts but even threats to the constitutional order. This broad definition has facilitated aggressive action against ISIS suspects – but it has also drawn criticism for sweeping up non-violent dissenters (such as journalists or activists) under “terror” charges.

Notably, Turkey’s legal and institutional counter-terror apparatus has sometimes complicated matters. The post-July 2016 coup-attempt environment led Turkey to purge thousands of military and police personnel accused of loyalty to the Gülen movement (deemed the “Fethullah Terrorist Organization” by Ankara). While these purges were considered necessary by the government, they temporarily strained Turkey’s counter-terror apparatus by removing or reassigning many experienced officers. Nonetheless, Turkey adapted by funneling resources to counter-ISIS efforts and improving coordination among agencies.

By the late 2010s, Turkey also had to deal with the aftermath of ISIS’s territorial defeat. This included managing returning foreign fighters (both Turkish nationals and foreign ISIS members who ended up in Turkey). Ankara generally prefers to repatriate foreign fighters to their home countries – a stance President Erdoğan has emphasized with remarks like “take care of your own problem” to European states reluctant to receive their ISIS citizens. For Turkish citizen returnees from Syria/Iraq, Turkey has employed a mix of incarceration and rehabilitation. Some hardened fighters have been prosecuted, while others (especially family members or those not directly involved in violence) undergo monitoring and deradicalization programs. Turkish officials claim their efforts have “spared Turkey from ISIS attacks for more than three years” after 2017, though recent incidents demonstrate that vigilance must remain high.

In summary, Turkey’s counter-terrorism policy regarding jihadism has shifted from a hands-off, strategic ambivalence to a multifaceted campaign of repression and prevention. Today, Turkish counter-terror units carry out near-daily operations against ISIS suspects, and Turkey actively participates in regional counter-ISIS initiatives. The policy continues to balance hard security measures with broader political calculations – for instance, Turkey’s simultaneous fight against PKK-linked Kurdish forces sometimes overshadows the jihadist threat in Ankara’s rhetoric, leading to divergent priorities with Western partners. Yet as jihadist networks adapt (for example, ISIS cells going underground or ISIS-K seeking footholds), Turkey has shown an ability to recalibrate its responses to meet the evolving challenge.