Israel Can’t Decide: Can Syria’s Leader Be Trusted?

Is the new president of Syria Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the jihadist in military fatigues, or is he Ahmed al-Sharaa, a suit-and-tie wearing Muslim “moderate” who has no interest in making war on Israel? The Americans seem to believe he can be trusted, have lifted all sanctions on Syria, and have also encouraged American investment in the country. The Israelis are not at all sure if he is the jihadist or the moderate pragmatist. There is evidence to support both views. More on the Janus-faced Syrian president can be found here: “Sharaa or al-Julani? IDF still suspicious of Syrian leader after Sweida massacre – analysis,” by Yonah Jeremy Bob, Jerusalem Post, July 29, 2025:

The IDF is still suspicious of Syria’s leader and wondering whether, between two of his names symbolic of his dual identities, he will turn out to be more of his jihadist past as Mohammad al-Julani or Ahmed Al-Sharaa, the suit and tie wearing technocrat official he has portrayed himself as since taking power from the Assad regime in December 2024.

IDF sources treat the two names as symbolic, with almost a “Dr. Jekyl” and “Mr. Hyde” dual personality quality, making it clear that they do believe there is a true internal struggle going on within Syria’s leader as well as among his various allies and potential allies who are trying to pull him in one direction or another.

In the balance is whether Israel now has a new, greater threat in Syria than even the Assad regime, if not in sophistication of weapons, then in ferocity and commitment of its forces to invading and fighting against non-Muslims….

Assad was a mass murderer, but he was not ideologically driven, and spent his time trying to hold onto power rather than engage in jihad against the Infidels of the Jewish state. But al-Sharaa was for many years a leader of fighters in al-Qaeda. At one point, the American government offered a bounty of $10 million for his capture or killing. Should he remain true to those jihadist views, even though he now claims he has abandoned them, then he, and his inner circle, will be unlikely to countenance the continued existence of Israel.

Both in private but also in public, al-Sharaa has said he has no desire to fight Israel and could even potentially reach normalization with it sometime in 2026.

But what are his conditions? If Al-Sharaa will only “normalize” relations if Israel agrees to give back to Syria that part of the Golan which Israel annexed in 1981, this is a demand that Israel will never agree to, and there will be no “normalization.” Perhaps he now says he has no desire to fight Israel in order to win American support, including investments that will help in the rebuilding of the country’s infrastructure that was destroyed during the fourteen years of the civil war.

The Israelis are still not convinced that al-Sharaa’s smooth assurances about peace with Israel should be believed. He was a jihadi for several decades. Can his putative transformation be believed?

More than 1,400 Alawites, most of them civilians, were massacred in Latakia by Sunni Muslims, including members of al-Sharaa’s own rebel group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). There was no sign that al-Sharaa tried to stop the massacre, or that he has made any efforts since to punish those who took part. This leaves Israel suspicious of his claim to have abandoned his jihadist beliefs.

In Sweida, Syrian army troops intervened, ostensibly to stop the fighting between the Druze and the Bedouin, but instead ended up joining in the massacre of Druze civilians. It was only the IDF’s bombing of Syrian troops in Sweida, and of Syrian army headquarters in Damascus, that led the Syrian army to pull out of Sweida. It was then allowed by Israel to return, but only in order to stop the Druze-Bedouin fighting.

The Druze in Israel, meanwhile, have fought on the side of the Jews ever since the 1948 war of independence. They are the only non-Jewish minority who are drafted into the military, where many Druze have served with distinction. Major General Ghassan Alian, the head of COGAT (Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories), is a Druze. As a consequence, the Israelis frequently explain that they support the Syrian Druze because “the brothers of our brothers are our brothers.”

After Assad fled to Moscow in December 2024, Israel made 600 300 airstrikes in that month alone, and another 300 so far in 2025, with the goal of destroying as much of Assad’s weaponry that it could. The targets included artillery, tanks, planes, drones, and missiles. The IDF was determined to prevent those weapons from being seize by the new regime for possible future use against the Jewish state. The attacks were successful; the Syrian army now has little in its arsenal that could threaten Israel.

Israel annexed the “Israeli” Golan in 1981. Though the writer of the Jerusalem Post article above claims that three governments — those of Rabin, Netanyahu, and Barak — “seriously considered” a return of that territory, there is no evidence of this. Annexation by Israel clearly meant that there would be no further discussion about that territory; it would remain, like east Jerusalem, part of Israel forever. And the events since then, including the October 7, 2023 attacks, make it more imperative than ever that Israel hold onto not just part of the Golan, but to both sides of the Golan, in order to prevent a possible attack by Syria on the Jewish state. The Jewish state needs to hold onto the commanding heights on Israel’s northern border with Syria.

The notion that the Syrian government might form an alliance with Turkey seems doubtful, given that the Turkish army has seized large swathes of Syrian territory and has made clear it intends to stay, mainly in order to keep a close watch on the Kurds in Syria, and any attempts they may make to secede from Syria and even to form an independent Kurdistan that would include tens of millions of Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. Qatar is a more likely ally, but Qatar’s support for Hamas, which means for the Muslim Brotherhood, would worry al-Sharaa if he indeed has abandoned his previous jihadist views. Syria’s most promising ally is the UAE, which is a “moderate” Muslim country, has good relations with both the Americans and Israelis, and has a trillion dollars in its sovereign wealth fund which means it can pony up a great deal of money to support the rebuilding of Syria’s infrastructure, so much of which was destroyed in the civil war.

What do the Israelis think of al-Sharaa, or al-Jolani, now that he’s been in power for eight months? He says the right things, about not wanting war with “any of Syria’s neighbors,” including Israel. He has held out a promise of “normalizing” relations with the Jewish state. He has not promised any revenge for the IDF’s numerous airstrikes to destroy Syria’s weaponry, with 600 airstrikes in December 2024, and another 300 so far in 2025. As a pragmatist, al-Sharaa knows he needs American goodwill to ensure that his country benefits from Western investment. That’s his al-Sharaa side.

But on the other hand, his troops helped to massacre the Alawites in Latakia, perhaps with his blessing, and the Druze in Sweida as well. He has now promised to punish those who took part in either of those atrocities; so far no arrests has been made. That’s his al-Jolani side.

The Israelis continue to ponder the two sides of Syria’s president. In the view of the Jewish state, which one will prevail?