Iran Claims to Have Obtained Documents About Israel’s Nuclear Plans and Facilities

We all remember how, in 2018, a team of Mossad agents aided by Iranian collaborators managed in the middle of the night to locate the nondescript warehouse in Tehran where Iran had stored its entire nuclear archive. Within a few hours, the Israelis managed to blast their way through dozens of steel doors, racing against time because they knew guards would return early in the morning, and then made off with all of the documents — about 100,000 of them — and took them back to Israel.

Now the Iranians want to convince the world that they have pulled a similar feat, claiming to have acquired a treasure trove of documents about Israel’s nuclear plans and capabilities. The Iranians haven’t yet produced any evidence of this, but claim they will soon do so. More on their supposed intelligence coup, which may or may not be true, can be found here: “Iran claims it stole thousands of Israeli intel. materials, including nuclear docs. – report,” Jerusalem Post, June 7, 2025:

Iran has obtained Israeli intelligence materials, including sensitive documents related to Israel’s nuclear capabilities, Iranian-affiliated media reported on Saturday.

The intelligence materials allegedly include thousands of documents related to that regime’s nuclear plans and facilities.

The documents were transferred from within Israel to Iranian territory, Hezbollah-affiliated Al Mayadeen remarked.

Even though the mentioned operation was carried out some time ago, “the abundance of documents is such that reviewing them and viewing images and videos has taken up a significant amount of time,” sources told Iran’s Tasnim News Agency.

Due to the need to securely transport the leaked materials into Iran, a period of media silence was maintained to ensure their safe arrival “at protected destinations” in the country, sources emphasized.

Prosecutors indict two Israeli nationals for spying on behalf of Iran

Roi Mizrahi and Almog Attias, both 25, were allegedly in contact with an Iranian intelligence operative who instructed them to install spy cameras, according to an Israeli indictment filed in May. While there is no confirmed link to the recent Israeli intelligence leak, sources suggested that these suspects may be linked to the alleged intel leak….

While these two Israelis apparently were spying — for money — on behalf of Iran, it would be amazing if such young men — both 25 — so early on in their employment by, I assume, one of Israel’s intelligence agencies, would have had access to such top-secret material. It is likely that the Iranian regime wants the world, and especially its own people, to believe that it is capable of such an intelligence coup, even more impressive than what the Israelis did when they carried off Iran’s nuclear archive in 2018. It would certainly be a way to raise morale among an increasingly restive population, a deed of derring-do that could impress even Iranians unsympathetic to the regime.

Mizrahi is not charged with harming the state’s security, which suggests he had nothing to do with transmitting any information about Israel’s nuclear plans and capabilities. It is Attias who was “intending to harm the state’s security.” “Intending to harm” is not the same thing as having harmed; was Attias attempting to acquire and transmit documents (or photographs of them) about the Jewish state’s nuclear plans, but was somehow foiled in the effort, and instead “provided information to the enemy” of a different, lesser kind? Or did he have information about Israel’s nuclear plants, but was foiled, presumably by the Shin Bet and Mossad working together, from successfully delivering that information to Iranian agents?

To sum up:

The charges, as stated, leave us wondering what kind of information was provided to Iran by Attias that was “intended to harm state security.” That is different from accusing him of “harming state security.” That leaves open the possibility that the information he provided to the Iranians did not, though it was intended to, harm “state security,” because it was of far lesser significance than what Iran is now claiming. Or it could mean that Attias did indeed have such harmful intelligence information, but was unable to deliver it to the Iranians — “intending” but not succeeding “to harm the state’s security” — despite what they are now claiming.

Within a few months, after Iran makes public the information it now boasts of possessing, we should have the answers to those questions.