The Houthis Have Miscalculated

The Houthis have convinced themselves that they will be able to survive the aerial attacks that the Americans have recently launched on military airbases, ports, and on weapons depots and combatants in northern Yemen; they think the Americans will tire of the fight, and will choose to concentrate their efforts elsewhere, on negotiating with Iran on halting that country’s race to manufacture nuclear weapons, on winning the economic war with China, and in bringing the Russo-Ukrainian war to a conclusion that Trump deems satisfactory. According to the author Amine Ayoub, the Houthis are counting on this administration’s attention deficit disorder. But Ayoub argues that they have badly miscalculated. More of his argument can be found here: “Why the Houthis Think They Can Beat the US — And Why They’re Wrong,” by Amine Ayoub, Algemeiner, April 22, 2025:

The Houthi rebels have spent years crafting an image of themselves as a hardened, battle-tested force capable of standing up to the most powerful militaries in the region. Now, in the midst of heightened tensions in the Red Sea and ongoing attacks on commercial shipping, they’ve extended that illusion to the United States. Emboldened by years of asymmetric victories against Saudi Arabia, bolstered by Iranian weaponry, and legitimized by propaganda that casts them as the spearhead of a broader “resistance” movement, the Houthis have convinced themselves — and their supporters — that they are capable of not just resisting US military pressure, but prevailing against it.

This belief is a dangerous miscalculation.

Their confidence stems, in part, from real battlefield experience. For nearly a decade, the Houthis have survived and even thrived despite relentless airstrikes, economic blockades, and shifting coalitions aligned against them. Saudi Arabia, with its modern air force and US-supplied munitions, failed to achieve decisive victory, and the perception within Houthi circles is that American power will be no more effective. Their propaganda machine amplifies every moment of defiance — a ship that reroutes, a drone that gets through, a Western strike that doesn’t dismantle their network — and translates it into a narrative of victory. To them, every surviving radar station is proof that the empire can bleed.

The Houthis should not expect that American military pilots, the best in the world, will prove as ineffectual as the famously incompetent Saudi pilots.

But the United States is not Saudi Arabia. The comparison reflects not just poor military judgment, but a profound misunderstanding of American strategic capacity and intent. Unlike regional actors, the US is not burdened by the political minefields of sectarian loyalties, tribal politics, or proximity. It can strike from the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden, or from submarines under the Red Sea. It does not need to occupy territory to destroy critical infrastructure. And when Washington decides that a threat must be neutralized, it tends to play a long game — using precision, partnerships, and pressure points until that threat is either dismantled or buried under economic and military consequences.

The Houthis lack the strategic depth to survive this kind of prolonged targeting. They are not a state with layered defenses, they are a militia with a territory — and that territory, while difficult to fully conquer, is not indestructible. Their command centers, storage depots, and drone assembly lines can only be relocated so many times. A concentrated American campaign, especially if paired with increased maritime interdiction and regional intelligence sharing, would gradually degrade the very tools that have made Houthi escalation possible. Their coastal control gives them influence over shipping routes, but also makes them highly visible. Their reliance on external supply chains — from Iran through smuggling routes and covert logistics — exposes them to disruption and surveillance. The longer they play this game, the more they risk pulling the US into a sustained campaign that their organization is not structurally prepared to endure.

The Houthis inhabit only the northern third of Yemen. That’s a small sliver of land, providing no strategic depth. On the other side of the border, the troops of their enemy, Saudi Arabia, are ready to attack them if they sense the Houthis have been sufficiently weakened by the Americans. The attacks on the port of Hodeidah make it ever more difficult for the Iranians to deliver weapons by sea to the Houthis. So do the attacks on Yemen’s handful of airbases, where Iran in the past was able to land shipments of weapons. The Houthis are using up supplies that are not, unlike in the past, being replenished.