Israel, America, and Negotiating with Iran 

With Israel concerned that the Trump administration may cut a weak new nuclear deal with Iran, one way out of such a scenario could be a theoretical Mossad operation that kills the key Iranian official who ordered 400 ballistic missiles fired on Israel in 2024, think-tank sources conjectured to The Jerusalem Post. More on this possibility, and on other ways to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, are considered here: “Could Mossad kill IRGC air force chief to open up striking Iran nuke program?,” by Yonah Jeremy Bob, Jerusalem Post, April 15, 2025:

With Israel concerned that the Trump administration may cut a weak new nuclear deal with Iran, one way out of such a scenario could be a theoretical Mossad operation that kills the key Iranian official who ordered 400 ballistic missiles fired on Israel in 2024, think-tank sources conjectured to The Jerusalem Post.

The purpose of this theoretical scenario would be to provoke the Islamic Republic into a new direct attack on the Jewish state, which could then be used as a basis for a wide strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities even after a new nuclear deal would have been cut with US President Donald Trump.

Brig.-Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps air force chief, publicly declared his role in trying to harm Israel in multiple rounds of attacking it with around 400 ballistic missiles in 2024.

A number of Israeli and American officials even discussed assassinating him in last October as a potential response to Tehran’s second direct attack – though in the end, Jerusalem sufficed with destroying Iranian air defense and ballistic missile production capabilities.

Although Hajizadeh failed to kill Israelis, this was only due to a monumental air defense effort by the US, Israel, and many other allies.

Of course, there is still hope that the Trump administration can be convinced to either demand a deal that truly cuts off the ayatollahs’ path to a nuclear bomb or to maintain the current maximum pressure campaign, Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright told the Post.

According to Albright, “For the first time in years, maximum pressure is working, and it can be ramped up further. Moreover, the military option is credible. The Iranian regime is facing the prospect of its collapse.

“Without concessions that go beyond JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), it is better to keep increasing pressure,” he said.

“If the regime refuses to make these concessions, then it makes sense to carry out targeted destruction of key nuclear assets and capabilities, and perhaps certain leaders – with a threat to destroy far more, such as economic targets and leadership – if the regime moves to rebuild its nuclear sites or starts to build a nuclear weapon,” Albright said.

Trump must secure Iranian concessions

Former National Security Council (NSC) chief Jacob Nagel echoed to the Post, saying that Trump should not get deep into negotiations with Iran, as it seems he is doing, unless he first secures most of the concessions needed to end its nuclear program.

Accordingly, both Nagel, who is currently a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Albright agreed that the key is framing the process as an Iranian surrender of its nuclear program, with the negotiated details being more about the timing of taking it apart and of Iran receiving sanctions relief following its compliance.

But what if Trump does go forward with a deal that he frames as better than the 2015 JCPOA Iran nuclear deal, and that does have some advantages, but still leaves far too many loopholes for a country already far closer to crossing the nuclear threshold than it has ever been?

Nagel warned that Trump’s current direction seems to be the “less for less” model nuclear deal in which “they want to carry out the model of interim confidence-building measures.”…

The experts Albright and Nagel, who have been warning about Iran’s progress toward a nuclear bomb for years, agree that Witkoff’s approach — discussing sanctions relief before Iran has said a word about what concessions it is prepared to make on its nuclear program — is the wrong one. Iran is now in a weakened state. Its proxies — Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen — have all been nearly destroyed, the first two by the IDF, the third by relentless American bombing. The Syrian army, that used to be run by Alawite officers closely allied with Iran, is now run by Sunni jihadists in Damascus who hate the Shi’a Iranians. Iran’s economy is collapsing; one USD is now worth more than one million rials; when Khomeini came to power in 1979, the exchange rate was 42,000 rials to a dollar. Iran’s poverty rate is now above 30%. Finally, Iran’s anti-missile defenses, including all of its Russian S-300 batteries were destroyed by the IDF on October 26.

Given all of Iran’s economic and military weaknesses, Witkoff should not be making any concessions to Iran as he has seemed prepared to do, but instead, at a minimum, follow the prescription set out by David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and National Security, who knows as much about Iran’s nuclear program as anyone on earth. According to Albright, the Trump administration needs to do the following: secure concessions from Iran should include 1) destruction of its excess centrifuges 2) blending down of all 20%and 60% enriched uranium; 3) demonstration of cooperation with the IAEA including revealing all of its heretofore hidden nuclear sites; and 4) major progress on issues of undeclared nuclear material and activities before there will be any lifting of sanctions.

Ideally, David Albright would be made a member of Witkoff’s negotiating team. He would serve as a brake on the chief American negotiator, who so far has shown a dangerous willingness to offer sanctions relief before getting a clear commitment from Iran to halt, and reverse, major parts of its nuclear program. If Iran agrees to the first set of concessions noted just above, then the lifting of some sanctions could be discussed, and ideally that would take place after Iran further agrees to close down the Fordow nuclear plant that has been built inside a mountain, and to allow the monitoring of the JCPOA nuclear deal for a much longer period — twenty years instead of ten.

Of course the Iranians must keep in mind that both America and Israel still have the ability to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, either separately or in tandem, and the American negotiatiors should continue to suggest that option is being seriously considered — which, of course, it is.