How the IDF Almost Wiped Out Hezbollah Early in the War

A fascinating story — absolutely riveting — about how Israel’s military and political leaders considered, debated, took into account the Americans’ views, weighed the possible pros and cons, and ultimately rejected a preemptive attack on Hezbollah in the first few days following Hamas’ attack on October 7, 2023, can be found here: “How Israel almost wiped out Hezbollah, only days after October 7 – exclusive,” by Yonah Jeremy Bob, Jerusalem Post, February 5, 2025:

…The defense minister tried to press the prime minister into a major strategic attack that he did not want to undertake, or alternatively, put the prime minister on the spot and on the record as not being willing (or being afraid) to take military action, which would be the worst possible kind of meeting Netanyahu could conceive of.

Gallant recalled to Netanyahu the point made by Halevi, about taking down the stronger enemy before the weaker one.

He added his own arguments: A pre-emptive attack would be the best way to get ready for the inevitable Hezbollah rocket attacks on the home front, and that once Hezbollah did launch such an attack, it would dwarf the power that Hamas could bring to bear after October 7, if only because Hamas’s rocket and missile arsenal was a fraction the size of Hezbollah’s.

“Listen, it’s complicated,” Netanyahu said. “What will the Americans say?”

Gallant felt that all that mattered was the view of the State of Israel.

Netanyahu objected again, saying: “We also need a national-unity government immediately, and we cannot carry out consultations for that at the same time that we would be initiating a massive conflict with Hezbollah.”

Gallant was fine with forming a national-unity government as long as it did not hold up the attack and believed plans could go forward on all fronts at the same time.

When the security cabinet met later, while Netanyahu talked about a tough response, he wove into his comments phrases about the need to weigh the views of the US and National Unity leader Benny Gantz, considered then as a political ally who would join a unity government.

In turn, Gantz, supported by his No. 2 Gadi Eisenkot, wouldn’t conceal his opposition to a major strike on Hezbollah at this stage. For him, the risks of a larger Hezbollah war outweighed the benefits of a preemptive move, even one that would eliminate the possibility of an ongoing, grueling, and costly confrontation on the northern front.Netanyahu focused on the Americans, saying they should be further consulted.

Gallant opposed this, believing the US would veto it.

Netanyahu ignored Gallant and ordered Dermer to call Sullivan a second time. The prime minister paused the cabinet meeting and said they would reconvene a few hours later after the second Dermer-Sullivan call.

Dermer and Sullivan spoke in the mid-afternoon, with Dermer telling Sullivan, according to War, “The direction of the debate is shifting in the direction of a preemptive strike.”

Sullivan responded by warning that an attack on Hezbollah would lead to a massive regional war.“What you are thinking about doing is dangerous. It’s irrational… do not go ahead with it.”

But Israel did attack Hezbollah — not preemptively, but in response to the attack launched by Hezbollah on October 8. And was there a “massive regional war” as predicted by Jake Sullivan? No.

Sullivan also later dictated a message to a Dermer aide: “Jake to Ron: Your information is false. You’re making decisions in the fog of war. Slow down.”…

It seems to have been American opposition that proved decisive in persuading Prime Minister Netanyahu to reject a preemptive strike on Hezbollah, one that might not only have prevented missile attacks by the terror group on northern Israel, and thus obviated the need for 60,000 Israelis to leave their homes in the north, but also demoralized Hamas and caused it, within a month, to be ready to accept a ceasefire. The Bidenites have much to answer for.

The Americans, of course, turned out to be dead wrong about Hezbollah, right down to dismissing the idea that the terror group would use paragliders. That is exactly what Hezbollah did.

Biden, the self-described “Zionist,” threatened Israel with a souring of relations if it went ahead with a preemptive strike on Hezbollah. It was this reaction of the Americans that had the most influence on Netanyahu’s ultimate decision.

Also, the Biden team would say that Israelis often tossed out partial intelligence findings alleging major strategic conclusions, but when the intelligence was examined, it was often thin air.

Blinken said the Israelis are “30 minutes from launching a preemptive, or preventative in their minds, attack based on totally erroneous information.”…

What was that “totally erroneous information”? Didn’t Hezbollah launch its attack on October 8, as Halevi and Gallant feared? Didn’t some of its soldiers use mechanized paragliders to land inside Israel — the ones that Eric Kurilla of CENTCOM had dismissed as figments of the Israeli military’s imagination?

Did Israel make the wrong decision, in failing to carry out a preemptive and devastating strike on Hezbollah in the first days of the war, when such a crippling strike might have obviated the need for 60,000 Israelis to leave their homes in the north of the country? And when such a strike would have so demoralized and frightened Hamas that it would have been willing within a month — instead of sixteen — to cut a deal with Israel for a ceasefire?

I came away thinking that the wrong decision had been made, but I am not privy to so much more one would need to know, including how fast 360,000 reservists could be called up, and deployed in the necessary numbers both in the south and in the north, or how much intelligence the IDF had on the location of the 150,000 missiles and rockets Hezbollah had in its arsenal, and how well the Iron Dome performed as an anti-missile defense system. And I can’t help thinking that the threats made by Biden to Netanyahu about the likely souring of relations if he went ahead with a preemptive attack on Hezbollah was the decisive factor in dissuading Netanyahu’s from taking action that might have saved many Israeli lives. A blot on Biden’s escutcheon.