Two Takes On Iran’s Nuclear Project

#1. Michael Mandelbaum argues that it is time for American policymakers to stop devoting all of their efforts in the Middle East to that will-o’-the-wisp, a permanent peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and instead to recognize that the Palestinians are not ready now, and may never be ready, to accept Israel. Instead, the next American administration should focus on Iran’s nuclear project, which threatens not just Israel, but also the United States and its regional interests. More on his argument can be found here: “What the United States Should and Should Not Do in the Middle East,” by Michael Mandelbaum, The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune, October 2024:

…The country that now threatens American interests is the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is conducting an active campaign to achieve dominance in the region by unseating governments friendly to the United States and evicting American forces from the Middle East. That campaign has met with considerable success. Iran now exercises substantial, indeed sometimes dominant, influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen….

If, however, the Islamic Republic should acquire nuclear weapons, as it is actively seeking to do, its capacity to harm America’s friends and American interests would expand dramatically. The most important task for American Middle East policy is, therefore, to prevent that from happening. This is especially the case insofar as the American government actively discouraged Israel from hitting Iran’s nuclear installations in its recent retaliatory air strikes on Iran. Blocking an Iranian bomb will require, at the least, mounting a credible threat to use force if Iran takes the final steps in building working nuclear weapons, and attacking the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities if that threat does not achieve its aim. Crippling the Iranian nuclear weapons program would not require repeating the unhappy experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq because American ground troops would not be needed; naval and air power would suffice….

If, in the wake of the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, the relevant Palestinians somehow undergo a political transformation that makes a durable settlement possible (and leaving aside the question of how the Israelis can be assured that such a transformation has in fact taken place), the United States could profitably lend its assistance, along with other countries, to bringing about such a settlement. Absent, however, the Palestinians becoming what they have thus far never been – a genuine partner for peace – the American government should waste no more time on what has come, over the years, to be called the peace process. The United States has more urgent Middle Eastern business, business that can, and must, be successfully concluded, with Iran.

#2. J. E. Dyer argues that Israel, despite reports that it had refrained from hitting nuclear installations, in fact managed to destroy a “critical node” in that country’s nuclear program.

More on Dyer’s analysis can be found here: “The nuclear program target in the 26 October 2024 strike on Iran,” by J. E. Dyer, The Optimistic Conservative, October 30, 2024:

A “critical node,” in the analysis of an enterprise like developing a nuclear weapon, is a bottleneck:  something that previous paths funnel down to, and something that must be passed through successfully to reach the goal of the enterprise.  A critical node cannot be bypassed.  It must be successfully negotiated….

…the significance of Taleghan 2 is that it’s a component in a critical node of the path to an Iranian nuclear weapon.  It’s not just a component; it’s a unique one.  If Israel’s strike took out infrastructure inside the building – and I consider it likely that it did – that’s a setback in getting through the critical node of actually weaponizing fissile material to produce a bomb….

Again, in a limited strike, Israel thought it worthwhile hitting Taleghan 2.  The decision to do that was probably not intended as a mere warning to Iran about Israel’s knowledge of Tehran’s nuclear weapons program.  An isolated warning of that kind would be counterproductive, informing Iran of peril but having no practical impact on the overall situation.

My bet would be on Israel wanting to have a practical impact: setting Iran’s program back by destroying a facility needed to successfully get through the critical node of weaponization.  There’s a real probability Israel achieved just that.

While Israel had promised the Biden administration it would not hit Iran’s oil or nuclear installations, the temptation to destroy the “critical node” in its nuclear program known as Taleghan 2 may have been too great. Or the IDF may have all along intended to hit it, despite the promise made to the Bidenites to avoid hitting nuclear-related installations. And because it would be hard to understand just what part that structure played in Iran’s nuclear program — as opposed, say, to the uranium enrichment plants at Fordow and Natanz — it might not be immediately recognized by the Americans as a “nuclear-related” site, and the Israelis could simply claim that the structure had nothing to do with a nuclear program but instead manufactured parts for Iran’s ballistic missile program. And even if the Americans understood the real purpose of Taleghan-2, they might not have wanted to criticize Israel about it so close to the election. If J. E. Dyer is right, Israel has in one fell swoop put a spanner in the works — destroying that “critical node” — of Iran’s nuclear program. Let’s hope he’s right.