‘Nationalism’ is Not the Problem in the Islamic World

Some say that the West is “Islamophobic.” Such claims are made in an old article that is worth revisiting: “Obsession with Islam blinds West to real problems,” by Omer Taspinar, Asia Times, March 13, 2019:

Take the Sunni-Shiite sectarian wars, for instance. Instead of an ancient Islamic rivalry rooted in theology, the sectarianized conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon are products of a geo-strategic competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The conflict primarily is about competing Arab versus Persian nationalism, not religion. And it is taking place most destructively in failed and failing states where governance has collapsed or is badly compromised.

What is the “driver of conflict” in Yemen if not the split between Shi’a Houthis and the Sunni-dominated government? If the conflict in Yemen is not between Sunnis and Shia but — as Taspinar claims — is, rather, a war of “Arab versus Persian nationalism,” why is it that the Shi’a Houthis, who are Arabs, wage war not just on Israelis, but on other Arabs, who are Sunni, and accept Shia “Persian” aid? They must place their Shi’a identity above their Arab one, but they are not “Persian nationalists.” In Lebanon, the now-decapitated Hezbollah emerged several decades ago not to promote “Persian nationalism,” but to increase the power of the Shi’a, who in the Lebanese political order had always placed last, after the Christians and the Sunnis. In Iraq, the Sunni-Shi’a conflict has been going on since the modern state of Iraq was created, with King Faisal I (reigned 1921-1932) trying as early as the1920s to minimize the rivalry; Sunnis continued to rule Iraq, with the Sunni ascendancy over the Shi’a reaching its peak under Saddam Hussein. That Sunni-Shia quarrel over power continues in Iraq, though for now, unlike under Saddam and during the first years of the American occupation, without major warfare. In Syria, the Alawite minority regards itself, and is seen by the Sunnis, as Shi’a, hostile to the majority Sunnis, who were always discriminated against under Alawite rule. The Alawites, like the Houthis in Yemen, chose during the civil war to ally themselves with the Persian Shi’a against Arab Sunnis. Some may wonder if Al-Assad really had a choice. But he might have relied on his Russian ally alone.

How can the “driver of conflict” in Syria be described as “nationalism”? It’s a revolt against the Alawites, by Sunnis, who despise their Alawite masters for belonging to a branch of Shi’a Islam. Let us grant Taspinar this: in Syria there is an overlapping socioeconomic issue. That is the huge corruption, represented by Rami Makhlouf, “Mr. 10 percent,” the cousin of Bashar al-Assad, and with $6 billion the richest man in Syria. But even without such corruption, the majority Sunnis would work to overthrow the Alawites.

In Iraq, the Sunnis refuse to accept the loss of power they suffered when Saddam Hussein was overturned, while the Sh’a refuse to relinquish any of the power that they finally acquired at the same time. The Sunni-Shia conflict in Iraq remains as potent as it has ever been. What is a “driver of conflict” in Egypt, if not Islam? It is Islam that leads some Egyptian Muslims to attack Christian Copts, their churches, pilgrims, shops, neighborhoods. Among Egyptian Muslims, there are opposing Muslim groups: those who support the Muslim Brotherhood and those who favor the forces, led by Al-Sisi, who want to wipe out the Muslim Brotherhood. These conflicts in Egypt have little to do with “nationalism and socioeconomic issues,” but rather, with the fervency, and fanaticism, of the faithful.

Similar dynamics apply to ISIS. This barbaric aberration did not emerge because some Sunnis suddenly decided to embrace an apocalyptic vision of theology. Yet most tomes on ISIS in Western bookstores claim precisely that.

The Islamic State is not an aberration in its ideology. There are many other groups that share its views — Al-Qaeda, Al-Shebaab, Boko Haram, Abu Sayyaf, Islamic Jihad, Al Nusra Front. Its members are unusual not in the contents, but in the fanaticism with which they practice their faith, and in their studied cruelty. They are prepared to act on what the Qur’an commands Muslims to do to Infidels (“fight them,” “smite at their necks,” “strike terror” in their hearts), to emulate the model of Muhammad as depicted in the Hadith (“I have been made victorious through terror”), and to sacrifice themselves.