Interview: Hamas Jihad in Israel October 7, 2023 — What Went Wrong?

INTRODUCTION

The world changed since October 7, when Hamas waged a terrifying and shocking attack on Israeli citizens, murdering over 1,200 innocent people. They slaughtered infants, raped women (and men), burned families alive, tortured people and then took hundreds of civilians hostage in Gaza.

HAMAS is the acronym for Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, which means “Islamic Resistance Movement.” Its Charter calls for the Islamic obliteration of Israel, “just as it obliterated others before it.” This obliteration is deemed the “Liberation of Palestine,” about which Article 13 of the Charter states: “There is no solution for the Palestinian question except through Jihad.” Article 15 instructs that “Jihad becomes the individual duty of every Moslem. In the face of the Jews’ usurpation, it is compulsory that the banner of Jihad be raised.”

Along with the “Liberation of Palestine,” Hamas leaders announced that their goal was the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate. Hamas has been the de facto government in the Gaza Strip since 2007.

Many have wondered, and still do, what went wrong leading up to October 7, particularly given Israel’s legendary and sophisticated military capabilities; its history of victory in wars with surrounding Arab neighbors that began upon its 1948 founding, again in 1967 (Six Day War), in 1973 (Yom Kippur War); and the ongoing jihad threat.

Yisrael Neeman has lived in Israel for 47 years. He teaches history courses about the Jewish people, Israel, and the Middle East at Haifa University and Technion International Schools, while leading academically oriented tours throughout Israel. He has also served for over two decades in the Israeli military as a combat medic.

Yisrael is author of the book Hamas Jihad: Antisemitism, Islamic World Conquest and the Pretense of Palestinian Nationalism.

We are pleased to interview him about what went wrong leading up to October 7. We appreciate Yisrael’s insights and candidness as our guest on Jihad Watch.

Christine: Yisrael, thank you for your time and willingness to share with us your unique and informed insights about what lead up to October 7.

Many have blamed the Israeli government and IDF for a slow response on October 7, and also for allowing Israel’s  borders to be penetrated by an estimated 3000 Hamas jihadists with such aggression. What is your view about this?

Yisrael: Israel’s failure to prevent the Hamas jihadi attack on October 7 across the Gaza border was the culmination of multiple dysfunctions in Israeli policies and security perspectives that spans than a decade. It cannot be blamed solely on the current government.

Christine: Do you believe that the climate of disunity in Israel played a role in Hamas’ timing?

Yisrael: Yes, it was a mix of corrupt political partisanship which replaced civil ideological debate. A fractured educational and value system lead to sectoral perspectives and a lack of national cohesion. The result was a breakdown of social unity nationwide. Finally there was the “Judicial Reform” pushed by the government, and a backlash which lead to a shattering of any social unity as perceived by Israel’s enemies.

Christine: You wrote a book about Hamas. Please give a quick overview of Hamas’ role in Gaza.

Yisrael: Hamas’ jihad objectives are clearly laid out in the Hamas Covenant (August 1988), which it deems to be “divinely inspired.” It declares the Jewish people the foremost enemy, demands the destruction of the Jewish state, death and/or subjugation of the Jewish people, the elimination of secular Arab and Palestinian nationalism, and full allegiance to the global jihad for world conquest.

While it is true that Hamas also served socioeconomic needs, known as the social dawa or “calling,” the military calling, or jihad, is dominant.

Christine: This is even more of a reason why Israel could not afford to have a loosely guarded border with Gaza, or to enact policies involving any trust in the Gazans, so what was behind Israel’s policy of deterrence that ultimately failed?

Yisrael: Despite Western self-delusions, one can never make peace with jihadis – such a concept does not exist. At best, one can have a “hudna” or Islamic limited term ceasefire of several years, where the jihadis pause to rearm, retrain, reorganize and restart their attacks.

Christine: “Limited” is a key word here, so is it fair to state that Israeli policy has been naive in its historic dealings with Gaza?

Yisrael: Left/Liberal or Right/Conservative political perspectives must never discount jihad theological imperatives. Bribing a jihadi-driven society with material well-being through Marxist communist or Adam Smith capitalist agendas, no matter how well-intentioned, only adds more funding to the jihad operation.

For the past fifteen years, Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Likud have been the most dominant party. Going back to June 2009, at first Netanyahu was willing to work toward a two-state solution, and expressed it after addressing the Iran nuclear threat during his speech at Bar-Ilan University. But that plan didn’t last. Due to right/religious pressures in Netanyahu’s coalitions, there was a deliberate policy to weaken the secular Palestinian Authority in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and strengthen Hamas after their overthrow of the PA in Gaza in 2007. At that time, Hamas was even defined as an asset in burying the two-state solution idea, as there could be no compromise.

In dealing with Hamas, a concept had emerged in the Israeli government that Hamas was under control, because of its socioeconomic and political  responsibilities in ruling Gaza. As of October 8, there were to be thousands more Gazans permitted to work in Israel.

Christine: In 2021, Israel issued 15,500 work permits to Gazans to work inside Israel. How did this policy harm Israel?

Yisrael: One must never strengthen jihad entities – it always backfires. But politics has no red lines or ideals – one does what is necessary to remain in power.

Christine: How would you assess Israel’s strategic effectiveness in securing its nation against Hamas and the broader jihad?

Yisrael: The security establishment analyzed Hamas’ hybrid behavior correctly as dedicated jihadis with a socioeconomic responsibility to its Gaza citizens. But Israel did not go far enough in recognizing the threat that built up over time.

The move towards a full jihad began in 2017, when Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif took over the Hamas movement and rapidly altered the balance. Sinwar was among the 1027 terrorists freed in the 2011 prisoner exchange for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who was captured by Hamas in 2006. The Shalit prisoner exchange was secured by Netanyahu.

From 2008 to 2022, there were four major border conflicts, but Hamas knew where to stop when testing Israeli responses.

Both the Likud-led governments and the top military brass were caught in “frozen thinking.” But Hamas was shifting from a hybrid Islamic society to a Palestinian Islamic state caliphate, like ISIS.

Israel’s military contraband blockade failed miserably, as equipment was smuggled across and under the border with Egypt.

Permitted dual usage materials such as cement and iron bars/pipes were used for tunnel construction and weapons. With support of the Netanyahu government, Hamas partnered with Qatar. But Qatar is a major jihad financier for Hamas and Western academia — to rebuild Gaza and empower Hamas further. Egypt also supplied fuel and building materials.

Christine: What you describe is a situation where Hamas was not adequately understood by the Israeli establishment, so security decisions were not based on the evolution of Hamas into what you referred to as a “Palestinian Islamic state caliphate.” Can you expand on the methodology employed by the Israeli government and security establishment?

Yisrael: There were those in the security establishment who warned of empowering Hamas, but their advice was ignored. This is another discussion.

Overall for the Israelis, building a hi-tech security fence above and below ground was “The Answer.” 

The security establishment with the full support of the government, Prime Minister Netanyahu and the opposition wanted to cut back on the military to make it “small and smart.” Very few opposed this concept.

The answer for Gaza was a hi-tech barrier with a six-meter fence, cameras and sensors. Some areas had cement walls, such as along  the northern sector facing towards Ashkelon. To stop tunneling into Israel, the cement barrier was dug underground by ten or more meters with sensors to pick up subterranean movement. When completed, it was called the “Iron Wall” by the previous chief of staff Aviv Kochavi. This had ideological political overtones, because it was a term used by the Revisionist Zionist leader, Ze’ev Jabotinsky.

Also, on the borders there were observer units (all female), who using hi-tech cameras and other equipment, scan across the border and pick up an enormous amount of information that is recorded, analyzed and written up in intelligence reports. These young women are based very close to the border and have no combat readiness; nor are they trained as such, as they are “military observers.” They are skilled and can help direct our forces, especially at night when there are firefights on the border. But there was no reason they should be stationed at a base right up against the border. They could have been ten kilometers away.

Christine: Hindsight is 20/20, but how did you view this hi-tech approach at the time?

Yisreal: Most Israelis, myself included, supported this approach, but I personally had reservations about making the army too small and cancelling a large amount of reserve service, especially maneuvers. I met reservists who had no training for five years. This reservation was proven correct when it took three weeks before Israel mounted a counter ground offensive in the wake of October 7, because of the necessity to retrain the reserves.

We had the time nonetheless, because we were dealing with Hamas and not an army with tanks, artillery, and air force, etc. The Israeli Air Force filled the gap during the interim. Had we faced a full modern army, it would have been a total disaster well beyond October 7.

Christine: Returning to the female observer units up at the Gaza fence, did that not prove disastrous for these young women on October 7?

Yisrael: These female soldiers were captured by Hamas. They have been in the news recently due to pressure to release them in the next round of exchange for Hamas terrorists in Israeli prisons. When they were captured, the Hamas terrorists recorded themselves discussing splitting them up as concubines and we are quite sure they continue being forced into sex slavery.

The stupidity of keeping them so close to the border continues to be discussed.

But it wasn’t taken seriously because of a concept that had developed that Hamas would not attack because of its social dawa responsibilities and the political necessity of Hamas rule in Gaza.

In fact, as of October 8, as I stated earlier, there were to be thousands more Gazans given permits to work in Israel. Hence warnings on the ground were ignored and the Gaza border was left with virtually no defenders and major military discipline slovenliness along the frontier.

Christine: You have studied Hamas and its leadership, reflected in your book Hamas Jihad, as Hamas evolved into focusing more on violent jihad; can you share Hamas’ modus operandi as it assessed and exploited Israel?

Yisrael: Sinwar not only has an excellent knowledge of Hebrew and Israeli politics after spending 22 years in security prisons, but is an acute observer of Israeli society.

Beginning in the 1990s but accelerating rapidly by the mid 2010s, Israeli society was breaking down into factions or “tribes” of left and right, secular, national religious, ultra-orthodox, different ethnic groups and Israeli Arabs (themselves fragmented).

When the present government began its judicial reform, viewed by opponents as a coup d’état against the judiciary, the vitriol on both sides increased to levels of civil conflict, with hundreds of thousands demonstrating weekly against the government. Many military volunteers and reservists either quit or decided not to train anymore – but made it clear they would show up in an emergency.

The deeply jihadist, brilliant and psychopathic Sinwar and Hamas saw their chance. Israeli society was deeply fractured, the military was unprepared and the government continued a policy which empowered Hamas.

Netanyahu was also pushing for full exemption of the ultra-orthodox community from military service, further infuriating the average Israeli. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant’s warnings of damage to Israel’s military preparedness as a result of the walk-out by reservists and volunteers were continually ignored.

Amid great divisions and protests, Hamas struck and shocked everyone.

October 7 has brought about temporary unity in Israeli society. But the fissures are still there.

Christine: Yisrael, thank you for sharing your insights into difficult questions which have been and still are on the minds of so many. We can certainly see Israel’s unity since October 7, and the government’s determination to dismantle the terror group Hamas and neutralize this serious threat to its citizens. We wish you well in your excellent ongoing work, and we pray for your safety on the Northern border.

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As a final note, for those readers who missed the documentary film of October 7 entitled Screams Before Silence, please view it HERE.