Ever since 2007, when Hamas crushed Fatah in Gaza, killing hundreds of its members and causing many others to flee to the West Bank, Hamas and Fatah have been at each others’ throats. Hamas has continued to rule in Gaza, squashing the slightest sign of Fatah’s reappearance. In the West Bank, Fatah – the armed wing of the Palestinian Authority – similarly has tried to prevent Hamas from establishing a beachhead in the West Bank. But recently, there have been signs that Hamas is winning ever more recruits in the West Bank, and is only waiting until Abbas leaves the scene to attack Fatah and seize control of the Palestinian Authority. “Is Hamas Attack the Beginning of West Bank Takeover?,” by David Hacham, Algemeiner, May 1, 2023:
…Hamas is seeking to create an offensive ring around Israel that constitutes a multi-front threat. As such, it is working to build terrorist infrastructure in Lebanon, in addition to its existing fronts against Israel — the Gaza Strip, which has been under the organization’s control since 2007, and the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority (PA), led by President Mahmoud Abbas, is growing weaker, and where Hamas is working to build a foothold.
Hamas is becoming steadily more popular in the West Bank because it is rightly seen, especially among younger Palestinians, as much more of a threat to the hated Israelis than are the PA and Fatah. Abbas is aware of this, and Fatah men have been attacking Hamas operatives whenever they can find them. This, however, only increases the popularity of Hamas, seen as the only effective “resistance” to the “Zionist entity,” and whose members are attacked by Fatah, derided as so ineffectual against Israel, yet so ferocious against Hamas.
Hamas’ grand strategy and its actions in Lebanon are ultimately aimed at boosting its quest of toppling the Fatah-run PA in the West Bank. The PA is gradually losing control there, especially in the Jenin region, and, to a partial extent, in Nablus.
Hamas has now established itself in southern Lebanon. Its April 6 rocket attack on Israel was meant to assert its arrival in that northern front. And the third, and final front the terror group wishes to open is in the West Bank, where Hamas hopes to displace Fatah just as thoroughly as it did in Gaza in 2007. It knows that the PA has largely lost control of two major cities, Jenin and Nablus, that have been hotbeds of anti-Israel violence, and wishes to take control in both cities before other groups, appealing to the young, like the recently-formed Lions’ Den, manage to do so.
Hamas exploited tensions on the Temple Mount, a highly sensitive Islamic site, to launch its attack from southern Lebanon, likely in full coordination with Hezbollah and Iran. A Hamas rocket attack of this scope could not have occurred without coordination and a green light from Hezbollah, which is the strongest organization in the Lebanese system. At the time of the April 6 attack, Hamas Politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh was visiting Lebanon, accompanied by his deputy, Salah Arouri — and that is no coincidence….
Hamas needed the approval of, and coordination with, both Hezbollah and its puppet-master Iran to launch its attack into the Galilee from southern Lebanon. And it received that approval, perhaps given in person by Hassan Nasrallah to Hamas’ political chief, Ismail Haniyeh, who at the time of the attack was visiting Lebanon.
Hamas was not trying to kill Israelis. It doesn’t want at this point to risk a crushing reprisal from the IAF. The April 6 attack was meant, rather, to signal that Hamas had now established its own second front against Israel in Lebanon. Those 34 rockets launched into Israel were a way to announce its arrival. And it also was meant to signal to Palestinians that after Gaza and southern Lebanon, there remains one more front for Hamas to conquer – the West Bank itself, where Fatah, however fitfully, still rules. Hamas hopes that during the confusion and infighting in Fatah that will follow Abbas’ death, it will be able to violently dislodge, and replace, the men of Fatah.
The rockets [launched by Hamas on April 6] were aimed at areas near the Lebanese border but were not intended to hit infrastructure targets of strategic significance. Given that, Hamas’ rocket attack was not a declaration of war, or an attempt to deteriorate the situation in a way that would create a general escalation and bring about a renewed military confrontation with Israel on a large scale….
Hamas was intent on avoiding any kind of escalation with the Israeli enemy. The terror group could have aimed its rockets to hit important infrastructure, both military and civilian, but instead it aimed its rockets so that they would fall just inside Israel, well away from any target of significance.
Both Mahmoud Abbas, and the PA he rules, are wildly unpopular. In a recent opinion poll, 80% of Palestinians declared that they wanted Abbas to resign. Hamas is patiently waiting, steadily gaining recruits in the West Bank, including even some defectors from Fatah, hoping that Abbas will soon depart from the scene, and while rival Fatah leaders try to inherit Abbas’ position, Hamas will be able to step in and take control of the Palestinian Authority. But this is not necessarily a bad thing for Israel. If Hamas takes control of the PA, Israel will argue that it cannot be expected to negotiate with a terror group (recognized as such by several dozen countries) and will break off all contact with the Hamas-ruled PA. And it will be impossible for the West to try to force Israel into negotiating with the very people who have been murdering Israeli civilians over several decades, and whose very Charter calls for the destruction of the Jewish state. Hamas’ uncompromising violence will paradoxically have the effect of relieving Israel from foreign, especially American, pressure to negotiate a now-impossible “two-state solution.”
Mahmoud Abbas is 87 years old and in poor health. He is increasingly remote from the responsibilities of rule. He occasionally appears in Ramallah to make a short speech; that’s about it. Meanwhile, his lieutenants are sharpening their knives, to be used against one another once the Rais in Ramallah has died. In such an environment, everything is uncertain, no one knows who will follow him, or even if someone from Fatah will still be in control, which seems increasingly unlikely given the inroads made by Hamas in recruiting new members in the West Bank.
In practice, Hamas has already taken concrete steps to exploit this instability and to position itself to challenge the PA for the Palestinian leadership as soon as the opportunity arises. This has included a reshuffling of Hamas operatives in the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem, with an emphasis on command levels, as well as cultivating operatives from the younger generations. These operatives include organizationally affiliated Hamas members, and other more loosely affiliated individuals with close ties to Hamas, such as academics, trade unionists, and public sector figures in the West Bank, and they are active in the Islamist stream within Palestinian local councils and civil society institutions….
Hamas has managed to expand in the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem, focusing on younger Palestinians to fill its ranks, unlike the sclerotic rulers of Fatah who seem uninterested in encouraging young blood. Hamas has also been “reshuffling” its operatives, selecting local commanders on the basis of merit, unlike the nepotism practiced by Fatah. It has created a network of people who may not be Hamas members but are closely tied to the terror group, from various walks of life – “academics, trade unionists, and public sector figures” — ready to support Hamas when it makes its move to seize power.
Hamas will initially plan to hold elections in the West Bank – after all, it was through elections in 2006 that it came to power in Gaza — but if it senses it will lose, it will jettison that idea and simply proceed with a military takeover of the PA territories. That will further reduce its standing in the world, and make Israel’s refusal to deal with the terror group even more justified.
One of the most prominent operatives among Hamas ranks in the West Bank is engineer Wazan Jaber, a representative of the younger generation in the terror group. A few weeks ago, an attempt was made to assassinate him, likely by Fatah members. Jaber was not injured.
Wazan Jaber is just the latest Hamas member whom Fatah has tried to kill; there is a long list of those who, unlike Jaber, did not survive such attacks. But Hamas has not been fazed.
It is worth noting that Fatah is well aware of Hamas’ intention to replace it. Fatah is actively engaged in an effort to limit Hamas’ power in the West Bank. This includes the continued existence of security coordination with Israel — albeit in a more discreet and limited manner since the PA’s January announcement of its cessation of coordination, in protest against an IDF security operation in the Jenin refugee camp.
Fatah engages in security coordination with Israel not because it is obligated to do so under the Oslo Accords, but only because they share a common enemy – Hamas. While the Shin Bet provides Fatah with valuable intelligence information on Hamas’ attempts at extending its power in the West Bank, Hamas has been able to provide Israel with information that helps the IDF to find and seize Hamas operatives.
The PA is also working to dry up sources of financial aid to Hamas, and Abbas has taken a series of measures to prevent Hamas from gaining a foothold in the Palestinian government system, such as keeping the Palestinian parliament dissolved, thereby preventing Hamas-linked parliament speaker Aziz Dweik from being considered as a legal heir to Abbas….
The PA will have a tough time trying to “dry up sources of financial aid to Hamas.” Hamas’ main sources of wealth are: first, the government of Qatar; second, the government of Iran; and three, rich Arabsls in the oil states of the Gulf. None of these will end their support for Hamas, and the PA has no way to interdict their payments to the terror group in its Gaza headquarters. Abbas has shown he is willing to do whatever it takes to prevent a Hamas-linked leader to succeed him; he even dissolved Parliament so that its speaker, Aziz Dweik, known for his ties to Hamas, would no longer be considered a possible “legal heir” to Abbas. It was an extraordinary move, dissolving Parliament just to prevent one potential rival, linked to Hamas, from even the mere possibility of succeeding him.
A Hamas military attack on Fatah positions is possible as soon as Hamas recognizes an opportunity to launch it.
Such an opportunity would arise if, in the immediate aftermath of Abbas’ death, several Fatah leaders were to fight one another for power, mobilizing their own supporters for violent confrontations. In such a situation of chaos and confusion, Hamas could then step in to “bring about an end to violence,” and to seize power for itself.
As far as Israel is concerned, there is no replacement for the PA; who would rule Area A of the West Bank in the PA’s place? Should Israel once again enter the Palestinian cities and assume direct responsibility over millions of Palestinians, in addition to being responsible for water and electricity? This is a delusional concept.
As such, Israel must work to ensure the preservation of the PA in the post-Abbas era, despite the PA’s many failings.
The PA has been, admittedly, a danger to Israel, but Hamas is even worse. The PA feigns moderation, but praises terrorist attacks on Israel. It maintains its “Pay-For-Slay” program, that provides generous lifetime stipends to imprisoned terrorists and to the families of terrorists who die while committing their terror attacks. This program both rewards past, and incentivizes future, terror attacks. But the PA does not itself launch terror attacks, though some of its individual members have on their own committed such attacks. Furthermore, the PA has been willing, not always but often, to collaborate on security in the West Bank with the IDF. After all, if the PA can help Israel capture, or otherwise foil attacks by, members of its dangerous rival, Hamas, it is perfectly willing to do so.
Israel cannot tolerate a terror group, especially one that has already taken over Gaza, to take control of the PA territories in the West Bank. It will have to step in to help the PA maintain control in Areas A and B – Area C remains fully under Israeli control — in the West Bank. The PA is colossally corrupt, and an untrustworthy “partner for peace,” whose leaders applaud terrorist attacks. But it’s still better than Hamas. So Israel will be compelled to help keep some post-Abbas version of the PA in power.