This violation of privacy by EU globalists creates an appearance of doing something amid their continued avoidance of a targeted response to jihad terror. It gives sweeping authority to EU governments to snoop on citizens of their choice. If the past is any indicator of where this plan is headed, the surveillance will end up being used against those considered to be enemies of the state by the globalist countries of the EU. Globalists have long regarded “populists” as enemies and have attempted to invent bogeymen such as “white supremacists,” while allowing jihad terror to advance essentially unopposed.
The central issue regarding jihad terror is not apps, but unvetted immigration and jihad preaching in mosques, Islamic centers and madrassas.
Jihadists have for quite some time infiltrated the refugee stream. In Germany, over half of their deportees went missing; among them were jihadists. In 2016, Germany admitted to losing track of 130,000 migrants, “raising fears over crime and terrorism.” Since then, including during coronavirus lockdown, EU countries have experienced swarms of Muslim refugees coming in unvetted via waterways.
Also, since 2016, France and Germany wanted the European Union to “crack down on encryption,” but did nothing that really would have curbed jihad terror, such as controlling immigration and monitoring mosques, Islamic centers and madrassas. Even in so-called jihadist hotspots, no such efforts have been made, because of fears of being called “Islamophobic” by Islamic supremacist groups across Europe, which have only been strengthened by reckless mass Muslim migration and continue to be.
The EU spy plan is nothing but a disguise, using the recent jihad terror attacks as an excuse in its globalist movement toward totalitarianism. The freedom of European societies is already threatened due to its curbing of the freedom of speech in the face of Sharia pressure. Cracking down on the encryption of messaging apps will likely only further that initiative.
“EU would like to crack down on encryption of messaging apps,” EN24, November 12, 2020:
The terrorist attack perpetrated last week in Austria reopens the debate on end-to-end encryption offered by certain couriers. Once again the EU would like to allow investigators to take a look at what at the moment is practically elusive.
A draft resolution adopted by the council of the European Union could force courier apps to allow intelligence services and police investigators to bypass the end-to-end encryption they offer. To do this, the EU would force services such as WhatsApp, Signal or Telegram to provide backdoors allowing the authorities to monitor or trace the exchanges of persons suspected of terrorism, or of individuals involved in online child pornography. The track of an outright ban on these encrypted exchanges would also not be completely excluded.
For the time being, the text under consideration by the EU council is not publicly accessible, specifies the Digital Factory, but the Austrian media ORF was able to consult a document revealing a revised version of this draft resolution.
A text still under study
Assuming that ” there are cases where the encryption makes the analysis of the content of communications (…) extremely difficult or practically impossible despite the fact that access to this data would be legal “, The document consulted by the ORF establishes that it is necessary to guarantee”the capacity of competent authorities in the area of security and criminal justice to exercise legal powers online and offline “. The Council of the EU nevertheless assures to support “the development, implementation and use of strong encryption ”. Consequently, the draft resolution recalls that it is necessary that these future measures be respectful of “principles of legality, transparency, necessity and proportionality ».
As the Digital Factory explains, if the EU moves towards a system of backdoors allowing the police and the intelligence services to have access to suspicious conversations, the institution will be confronted with the resulting security problems. by opening these “backdoors” in encryption systems. And for good reason, over time, these generally become simple vulnerabilities that other intelligence services end up exploiting, just like potential hackers.
The fact remains that this draft resolution still has to pass several stages before being eventually adopted and applied….