The Turkish author of the Hürriyet article on President Macron, that I began to discuss in an article yesterday, continues:
Macron made his comments ahead of France’s municipal elections, and according to some international news outlets, the message was intended to elicit support from right-wing voters.
But if we are to put aside the electoral timing of the statement, let’s not forget that France is home to Europe’s largest Muslim community (estimated at around 6 million, or 8 percent of the population) and the issue of living in harmony is not going to go away.
Right-wing voters are unlikely to be mollified by the mild suggestions of Macron – to ban foreign imams, as well as teachers of language (Arabic, Turkish) and Islamic “culture” in order to promote a severing of links with the home countries of French Muslims, in order to better create that “Islam of France” he keeps talking about but never quite explains. He has expressed the hope that such moves will make Muslims more likely to accept and follow French customs, as handshaking between men and women, He expects that removing these “foreign” influences will make Muslim students more willing to accept female teachers, and Muslim patients more willing to accept female doctors. He remains, despite his outward self-assurance , still uncertain about Islam, and the degree and kind of threat it represents. He still thinks a “solution” can be found, but there hasn’t been a “solution” to Muslim aggression against non-Muslims discovered in the last 1,400 years. That is something he cannot allow himself to think about – it is too upsetting.
The important point is to what degree France’s approach to the issue is healthy and whether the strategy will pave the way to the desired outcome.
At 2,000, France has the largest contingent of foreign fighters in Syria. As far as I know, there are a handful of Turkish-origin, French citizens among them. The crime levels among Turkish communities in France are lower than those of other migrant communities.
That Muslims in France have supplied the greatest number of foreign fighters in Syria – I assume the author is referring to those fighting for the Islamic State – points to the severity of the problem of “radicalization” and “separatism” that Macron hopes to solve. “Radicalization” is discussed by Macron as if it rests on a misinterpretation of Islam, but in truth, Muslims who have been “radicalized” are simply those who are prepared to put their beliefs into practice. All Muslims are taught to wage violent Jihad against the Infidels; most Muslims ignore this command; those who take it to heart, and act upon it, are the ones who join the Islamic State, Al Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, Al Shebaab, Boko Haram, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, and many other groups and groupuscules. It’s not a different set of beliefs – it’s the same Qur’an — but a different way to translate those beliefs into practice.
Now that the Maghreb countries will stop sending teachers and imams, will this help get rid of the causes of their frustrations?
The “frustrations” the Turkish author of this piece is referring to are those of Muslims in France who are at the bottom of the economic ladder, who are often unemployed or engaged only in menial jobs. We are being asked to believe that it is economic deprivation that explains the “frustrations” of Muslims who, as a response, what to separate from the larger society, which they regard with hostility and hate, and some even resort to terrorism. This is a false diagnosis. Many Muslims in France are not “frustrated” by being unemployed; they are glad to remain on the generous dole of the French state. They are eager to receive all the benefits that a generous welfare state provides, and not have to do a lick of work to be eligible. They receive free or highly subsidized housing, free medical care far more advanced than anything that was available in their countries of origin, free education, unemployment benefits, family allowances, and more. Many of them appear in no hurry to find gainful employment. Why should they, when they can do so well, receive so much, when unemployed? How many Muslims in France are trying desperately to find work, and how many are finding that with the benefits they receive, they can supplement their income with petty crime – burglaries, robberies, car-jacking and, especially, drug dealing – and do quite nicely.
The “frustration” of Muslims in France is prompted by the realization that Unbelievers still dominate, when by rights Muslims should be in charge. It is infuriating to have to observe French laws and customs, when it is the French who should be modifying their behavior to meet Muslim demands. Non-Muslims on top, Muslims on the bottom is simply not acceptable; such an order of things goes against the Qur’an, goes against Allah,goes against everything that Muslims are taughrt from an early age. One more time: the Qur’an insists that Muslims are the best of peoples and non-Muslims “the worst of created beings.” This topsy-turvy world of France, where the Unbelievers are in control over Believers! — they pass the laws, rule the roost, set the tone, lord it over Muslims – of course that is “frustrating” for Muslims.
Do the youngsters from African countries radicalize because of the preaching of imams or because of the same frustrations that push “native” French youth toward right-wing extremists, as argued by Professor Ayhan Kara? His research reveals that Muslims’ anger does not stem from their religious difference but from exactly the same reasons that anger other youngsters, such as economic difficulties, unemployment, the feeling of marginalization and the like.
It is unsurprising that Professor Ayhan Kara, a Muslim Turk, would insist that there is no real difference in the “frustration” of Muslim and non-Muslim youth. He wishes to minimize, or even dispense with altogether, the effect of Islamic teaching on the behavior and attitudes of Muslims. He wants us to believe that “Muslim anger” does not stem “from their religious difference” with the majority Unbelievers, but to economic difficulties.
This is the same specious argument we have heard ever since 9/11 – that poverty is the cause of Muslim terrorism. It won’t wash. Osama bin Laden was the multi-millionaire son of a billionaire father. His second in command, Ayman Al Zawahiri, is a doctor, from one of the most prominent families in Egypt; his great-uncle was Azzam Pasha, the first, Secretary-General of the Arab League. Of the 19 terrorists who took part in the 9/11 attacks, 15 were well-heeled Saudis and two were well-heeled Emiratis. Of the remaining two, Ziad Jarrah came from a wealthy Sunni family in Lebanon, while Mohammad Atta came from a wealthy family in Egypt None of the hijackers were economically deprived; all of them were from wealthy backgrounds. It was not economic frustration that motivated them, but the teachings to be found in the Islamic texts, Qur’an and Hadith. If they were “frustrated” it was only that they felt the American Infidels had to be put in their place. Many other terrorists, too, have turned out to be well-off. The underwear bomber, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, was the son of a banker, one of richest men in Nigeria. The Intel engineer “Mike” Hawash earned $300,000 a year. Major Nidal Hasan had his entire medical education paid for by the U.S. military, and was earning $90,000 a year which would triple once he left the service. Aafia Siddiqui had received scholarships from both Brandeis and MIT. She was an upper-middle-class Pakistani who, had she returned to Pakistan with two such prestigious degrees, would have been set for life.
In “Ending the Myth of the Poor Terrorist,” Claude Berrebi and Owen Engel take note of studies by researchers in Europe and America, who have investigated the backgrounds of thousands of terrorists, and whose data shows that Muslim terrorists are, on average, “wealthier and better educated than the median level in their respective societies.”
Berrebi and Engel continue: “But going back to Sept. 11, 2001, when 19 radical Islamic terrorists from al-Qaida hijacked four commuter planes and attacked the United States, a false consensus began to form among American politicians and experts scrambling to confront this new threat, that linked terrorism to poverty, ignorance, and hopelessness. In 2002, President George W. Bush declared that America “fights against poverty because hope is an answer to terror.” His secretary of state, Gen. Colin Powell, agreed. “The root cause of terrorism does come from situations where there is poverty, where there is ignorance.” The Bush administration’s perceptions about terrorist roots was soon echoed by rival American politicians and around the world.” Indeed, Muslims are keen to spread the notion that “poverty” and “unemployment” are the cause of the “frustration” that leads some Muslims to terrorism. This claim has had two effects. The first is that it persuades some in Western countries that they should give ever more economic support to Muslims living in their countries and more foreign aid directly to Muslim countries, as a way to diminish the threat of Islamic terrorism. It brings in more money. Second, it gets Islam off the hook. Western attention turns away from studying the ideology of Islam, which is the real source of Muslim terrorism, to focus on economic distress.
It is obviously unacceptable for teachers and imams to teach and preach in a way that would fuel France’s fear of “separatism.” One hopes that France can provide clear evidence to that effect when it comes to teachers and imams sent from Turkey.
The difficulty arises from the challenge of defining what amounts to “separatism.” For Macron, for instance, “a man unwilling to shake the hand of a woman” is “separatism.” Even Muslims can agree or disagree with that conviction. At the end of the day, religion is a highly sensitive issue and there could be additional complexities when it becomes a matter of a bilateral agreement between countries.
It might be easier for France to impose an agreement on its former colonies, but it is still noteworthy that it has not reached an agreement with Turkey, the only secular country which is benefiting from the program Macron wants to end.
Turkey under Erdogan is no longer the “secular country” it once was. The imams and teachers that Turkey had been sending to France, and who will no longer be permitted to preach or teach or even come to France, are vetted by the Turkish government. That government, under Erdogan, has been steadily re-islamizing the country; it appears it is refusing to come to an agreement – “it [France] has not reached an agreement with Turkey.” But in the end the French can simply refuse to allow the Turkish clerics in, and also can expel those already in France. It is difficult to see how Erdogan can have his way, especially since the three Maghreb states – Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia – have submitted to Macron’s demand to stop sending their imams to France. Erdogan is only further antagonizing Macron and the French. What can he do, after all, to make Macron change his mind? He has already “weaponized” the Syrian refugees whom he has now let loose on Europe, but Greece and Bulgaria have reinforced their frontiers with Turkey to keep out those immigrants; that “weapon,” once unsheathed, cannot again be used to threaten.
Then again, maybe we should not be so surprised to see that there have been problems given that Turkey’s Religious Affairs authority, the Diyanet, has become one of the most controversial institutions in the country over the past few years. The Diyanet’s approach toward women, as well as its head’s statements, have also irked and sparked reaction from the secular segments in Turkey. Turkey and France might find it hard to reach an agreement on such a sensitive topic. But finding a common ground could be easier if Macron avoided instrumentalizing anti-Turkey sentiment for his personal political gain – and if Turkey were to avoid interpreting the strategy as an effort to assimilate Muslims.
Whatever criticism one has of Macron for his miscomprehension of the ideology of Islam, he has not been “instrumentalizing anti-Turkey sentiment” for “personal political gain.” Macron has objected to Turkey sending warships to intervene in Libya, because he thinks all foreign powers should stay out of the country during its civil war. He sparred with Erdogan in 2019 at a NATO meeting over the definition of “terrorism,” which is how Erdogan wanted the alliance to describe the activities of the Kurds in Syria. Erdogan was enraged when Macron met with Syrian Kurds. Macron has real differences with Erdogan over policy; he has soberly expressed those disagreements and not been whipping up “anti-Turkey sentiment” as this Turkish writer claims.In fact, it is Erdogan who for the last decade has been whipping up anti-European sentiment in Turkey, demanding admission into the E.U., and suggesting the country is being kept out because of anti-Islam bigotry.