Perhaps the visit had a new purpose: for Netanyahu to fully apprise Sultan Qaboos of the continuing Iranian threat, and its possible consequences for Oman itself. Having been unable to persuade Sultan Qaboos to cut ties with either Iran or Qatar, the Crown Prince might have decided that the Israeli prime minister could help persuade Sultan Qaboos of Iran’s menace. Netanyahu could have brought with him information gathered by the Israelis — the head of Mossad came with him to Oman, about secret weapons factories in Lebanon, and Iran’s progress — far beyond what it had publicly declared — in its nuclear project, based on the 50,000 documents Israeli agents whisked out of their hiding place in Tehran this past summer.
He might have been able to convey to the Sultan the continuing Iranian threat, and have been received with better grace than the Crown Prince, for several reasons. First, the Omanis resent the pressure that the Saudis have put on them over the last few years, first about Oman’s refusal to cut ties with Iran, and then, over Oman’s refusal to join the anti-Qatar coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The Omanis don’t like the feeling of being bullied by the behemoth of the Gulf. The Crown Prince can be off-puttingly peremptory. Prime Minister Netanyahu, while impassioned on the subject of Iran, is no bully, and may have a better chance than did the Crown Prince to persuade Sultan Qaboos of the full menace posed by Iran.
Second, Netanyahu might be persuasive — where the Saudis might be seen as engaging in special pleading — in discussing the consequences of a possible Iranian victory in Yemen. Would the Iranians place bases there, as they are now trying to do in Syria? What would be the consequences of having Yemen as an outpost for the Iranian military, just to the southwest of Oman, for Oman itself? He might remind Sultan Qaboos that Iran has repeatedly threatened to block all oil traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, which if it were to be accomplished, or even just attempted, could lead to a larger conflagration in Oman’s vicinity. And the Omanis don’t like trouble; their whole policy has been to remain above the fray. But what if the fray comes to their neighborhood?
Third, Netanyahu might point to all the ways that disruption could be caused in Oman’s neighborhood by an Iranian-backed insurrection among the several million Shi’a in eastern Saudi Arabia. For those Shi’a have engaged in mass protests before against their Saudi masters, and might be inspired to open revolt by the example of a Shi’a victory in Yemen and the promise of military aid from Iran. The Shi’a happen to live where almost all of Saudi Arabia’s oil is produced, so Riyadh cannot possibly allow a separatist movement to succeed. The Saudis would attempt to suppress with their wonted brutality such a Shia revolt. While the Saudis are thus engaged, Iranians might find reasons to enter Oman “to help our Omani brothers” against possible Saudi invasion — that is, Iran would help itself to Oman. Oman’s population is only a few million; it could offer little resistance. Iran would then be able to control the flow of oil not just at the chokepoint of the Straits of Hormuz, but all the way down the Gulf to the Arabian Ocean. Iranian forces in Oman could link up with the Houthis in Yemen. This is not what will happen — Yemen is still up in the air — but what could plausibly happen, should Iran prevail in Yemen. Netanyahu may have discussed some, or none, or all of these possibilities, in his many hours of talks with Sultan Qaboos.
The Omani policy has always been to prevent, or stay well out of, conflict. Only once, in 1980, did Oman rashly agree to help Iraq bomb Iranian ships in the Gulf, a dangerous plan that the Americans talked the Omanis out of at the last minute. But Netanyahu, with the convincing force of his presentation — on view several times at the U.N. — might be able to persuade Sultan Qaboos to recognize the unique menace of Iran, and to recognize, too, that Oman, though it has not acted against Iran, is`still a potential victim of Iranian aggression because of its location. That should concentrate the Omani ruler’s mind, and could lead him, at long last, to join the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Egyptians, and the Israelis, in an anti-Iranian coalition of the willing. And that could even mean a pre-emptive stationing of Saudi, Emirati, and Egyptian troops in Oman, should Iran begin to get ideas.
Of course, this scenario only sets out what might be. But nor is it a wild surmise. The Israeli leader, reports insist, went to Muscat to discuss backchannel communications with Iran. Netanyahu would certainly like to help his friend the Crown Prince in his hour of need, and what better way than to provide him with a diplomatic coup, by persuading Sultan Qaboos to move away from his wonted neutrality, and forthrightly support the Saudis in their face-off with Iran?